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The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, NAFTA Chapter 11,
and the Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation
Maurizio Brunetti*
This essay takes its cue from the recent Interim Award rendered under Chapter
11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA")' on June 26, 2000 in
Pope & Talbot, Inc v Canada.2 Pope & Talbot implied that the awards of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal concerning expropriation were not relevant to the
interpretation of the expropriation provisions of Chapter 11 of NAFTA. My aim
here is to explain why, contrary to this suggestion, the precedents of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal are legitimate and helpful sources of law in NAFTA Chapter
11 disputes.
I.
Pope & Talbot, Inc is a Delaware company that owns a British Columbia wood-
products company ("Investment"), which manufactures and sells softwood lumber and
exports most of its softwood lumber production to the United States. Pope & Talbot,
Inc alleged that the way Canada implemented a 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement
("SLA") with the United States breached certain obligations under NAFTA Chapter
11, Section A. The SLA established a limit on the free export to the United States of
softwood lumber first manufactured, among other places, in British Columbia.
In its pleadings before the arbitral tribunal established under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA ("NAFTA tribunal"), Pope & Talbot, Inc asserted that Canada's Export
Control Regime implementing the SLA had limited the Investment's ability to carry
out its business of exporting softwood lumber to the United States, thereby
expropriating Pope & Talbot, Inc's investment. Pope & Talbot, Inc conceded that the
Export Control Regime was a "measure not covered by customary international law
Deputy Secretary-General, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague, The Netherlands.
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1. 32 ILM 605 (1993).
2. Pope & Talbot, Inc v Canada, Interim Avard (June 26, 2000) available online at
<http://www.dfair-maeci.gc.calna.nac/nafta-e.asp> (visited Feb 3,2001).
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definitions or interpretations of the term expropriation "; however, it argued that the
phrase "measure tantamount to expropriation" in NAFTA Chapter 11, Article 1110,
paragraph 1,' broadened the customary definitions to include the Export Control
Regime. In this sense, Pope & Talbot, Inc continued, this provision was similar to
Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration,5 which confers on the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal jurisdiction to decide, in addition to claims arising
out of "expropriations," claims arising out of "other measures affecting property rights." 6
The NAFTA tribunal denied Pope & Talbot, Inc's expropriation claim. In
reaching this decision, the NAFTA tribunal rejected Pope & Talbot, Inc's
interpretation of the phrase "measure tantamount to expropriation' in NAFTA
Article 1110, paragraph 1. In the NAFTA tribunal's view, "tantamount" meant no
more than equivalent, and "[r]eferences to the decisions of the Iran-US Claims
Tribunal ignore[d] the fact that that tribunal's mandate expressly extend[ed] beyond
expropriation to include 'other measures affecting property rights."
It is not entirely clear what the NAFTA tribunal meant by the latter statement.
If it meant that, because the jurisdiction of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
over "other measures affecting property rights" extends beyond customary
international law of expropriation, its decisions concerning "other measures" represent
lex speciais-that is, they have no relevance outside the context of that Tribunal-
3. See Pope & Talbot, para 94.
4. Article 1110, para 1, ofNAFTA provides:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of
another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.
NAFTA at Art 1110, para I (cited in note 1).
5. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran ("Claims Settlement Declaration") (Jan 19,1981), reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR
9.
Article I, para 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration provides in relevant part:
An international arbitral tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby established
for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of
nationals of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim which arises out of the same
contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of that national's claim, if
such claims and counterclaims ... arise out of debts, contracts ... expropriations or other
measures affecting property tights.
Claims Settlement Declaration at Art II, para 1.
6. See Pope & Talbot, para 94.
7. Id at para 104.
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then the NAFTA tribunal might have been right.8 If, however, it was implying that all
the decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal represent lex specialis, then
the NAFTA tribunal was wrong. As the following survey of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal's expropriation jurisprudence demonstrates, the Tribunal nearly
always relied on customary international law for its conclusions, and its awards have
practical relevance to a wide variety of factual situations that will arise under
NAFTA. Thus, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal's jurisprudence with respect
to expropriation may be a relevant body of knowledge from which arbitral tribunals
established under Chapter 11 of NAFTA may draw.
H.
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal ("Tribunal") first began deciding claims
for takings of property in 1983, and to date it has rendered approximately sixty awards
on this subject. Relatively few of those claims have involved a formal expropriation of
property, so the bulk of the Tribunal's decisions on takings relates to indirect
expropriation.9 The Tribunal draws on numerous sources, including customary
international law, in deciding cases." In particular, the Tribunal's expropriation
decisions have almost always applied customary international law. As a result, and
because its awards are published, the Tribunal has contributed "the largest single
8. One could also argue, however, as Pope & Talbot, Inc did, that measures "tanramoun" to
expropriation can encompass measures of interference with property rights that are less meere than
expropriation itself. If that argument were accepted, then the Iran-Unitcd States Claims Tribunals
jurisprudence relating to "other measures affecting property rights" could be regarded as relcvant to
the interpretation of NAFTA Article 1110, para 1. In support of that argument, Pope & Talbor,
Inc relied on comments by Dolzer and Stevens, who suggest that treaty provisions that define
'measures ... tantamount to expropriation" to include "impairment ... of economic value" possibly
represent 'the broadest scope in investment treaties with respect to indirect expropriation." This
applies "insofar as the inclusion of measures that cause the'impairment... of (the] economic value
of an investment, equates expropriation with a host of measures which might not otherwise be
considered as such under general international law." Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, B25teral
Investment Treaties 102 (Martinus Nijhoff 1995). The NAFTA tribunal flatly rejected Popz &
Talbot, Incs argument, stating that "measures should be subject to the requirements ofintenaional
law if they impair the economic value of an investment to a degree that is equivalent to
expropriation:" Pope & Talbot, para 104 n 87.
9. The term "indirect expropriation" as used in this essay also covers concepts such as "creeping
expropriation," 'de facto taking" and "constructive taking."
10. Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration provides the Tribunal vath maximum ducretion in
the choice of the applicable law. It states:
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice of
law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to
be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade, contract pro-isions and
changed circumstances.




corpus of precedent in public international law.., produced by any international
claims body.""
Because the expropriation cases before the Tribunal have presented many
different factual situations, the Tribunal has had the opportunity to examine a wide
variety of state actions alleged to be indirect expropriations. In addition to the
fundamental question of what constitutes a compensable taking under international
law, the Tribunal has addressed other important questions, including those relating to
the date of a taking, the attributability of expropriatory actions to the state, the
standard of compensation, and the valuation of property. It would extend beyond the
scope of this essay to discuss all the situations in which the Tribunal addressed the
question of state liability for indirect expropriations of property. Rather, this essay
examines a limited number of Tribunal decisions that have particular significance to
the development of an international law doctrine of indirect expropriation. 2 In all the
cases discussed below, the Tribunal relied on customary international law for its
conclusions on expropriation.
III.
In an early award, the Tribunal set forth the standard for determining whether
an indirect expropriation occurred:
[I]t is recognized in international law that measures taken by a State can interfere with
property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that they
must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the State does not purport
to have expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally remains with
the original owner."
In somewhat different terms, and using a perhaps less stringent standard than
that of "uselessness," in a subsequent award (by a different Chamber), the Tribunal
stated that a compensable taking occurs under international law "whenever events
demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it
appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral." 4 Later awards relied on these
holdings for support."
11. Charles N. Brower and Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 669 (Martinus
Nijhoff 1998).
12. For a comprehensive discussion of the Tribunals decisions in expropriation cases, see id at 369-612
(cited in note 11); George H. Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal - An
Analysis of the Decisions of the Tribunal 171-276 (Clarendon 1996); Allahyar Mouri, The International
Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal (Martinus Nijhoff 1994);
George H. Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 88 AmJ Ind L 585 (1994).
13. Starrett Housing Corp v Iran, Interlocutory Award No ITL 32-24-1 (Dec 19, 1983), reprinted in 4
Iran-US CTR 122, 154 (emphasis added).
14. Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v TAMS-AFFA, Award No 141-7-2 (June 29, 1984), reprinted in
6 Iran-US CTR 219, 225 (noting also the principle that a taking of property may occur under
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Concerning the question whether the intent of a government to expropriate is a
prerequisite for a finding of expropriation under customary international law, the
Tribunal, in two early, almost simultaneous awards (by two different Chambers),
seemed to embrace two different conclusions. In Sea-Land Service, Inc, the Tribunal
stated that a "finding of expropriation would require, at the very least, that the
Tribunal be satisfied that there was deliberate governmental interference with the
conduct of Sea-Land's operation, the effect of which was to deprive Sea-Land of the
use and benefit of its investment."" By contrast, in Tippetts, the Tribunal said that
"[t]he intent of the government is less important than the effects of the measures on
the owner, and the form of the measures of control or interference is less important
than the reality of their impact."' The Tribunal addressed the question again in an
award issued a few years later and endorsed the position taken by Tippetts, stating that
.a government's liability to compensate for expropriation of alien property does not
depend on proof that the expropriation was intentional."t '
The Tribunal has held that the fact that a state acted lawfully in accordance with
its own laws or was motivated by financial, economic, or social concerns does not give
rise, under customary international law, to a defense to an expropriation claim. In
Phelps Dodge, the Tribunal saidi
The Tribunal fully understands the reasons why the Respondent felt compelled to
protect its interests through this transfer of management, and the Tribunal
understands the financial, economic and social concerns that inspired the law
pursuant to which it acted, but those reasons and concerns canno~t relieve the
Respondent of the obligation to compensate Phelps Dodge for its loss.'
The Tribunal confirmed this approach in subsequent awards. For example, in
Birnbaum, the Tribunal, quoting Phelps Dodge,' concluded that, "for the purpose of
establishing the Respondents liability for the deprivation of the Claimant's ownership
rights, it is immaterial whether or not the Plan and Budget Organization may have
international law 'through interference by a state in the use of that property or with the enjoyment
of its benefits, even where legal tide to the property is not affectedl.
15. See, for example, Birnbaum v Iran, Award No 549-967-2 para 28 (July 6,1993). reprinted in 29 Iran-
US CTR 260, 267-68; Pa ne v Iran, Award No 245-335-2 para 20 (Aug 8, 1986). reprinted in 12
Iran-US CTR 3,9; Pbelps Dodge Corip v Iran, Award No 217-99-2 para 22 (Mar 19, 1986), reprinted
in 10 Iran-US CIR 121,130.
16. Sea-Land Service, Inc v Iran, Award No 135-33-1 (June 22, 1984). reprinted in 6 Iran-US CTR 149,
166.
17. Tippetts, 6 Iran-US CTR at 225-26. For a discussion of this apparent discrepancy between the two
awards, see Aldrich, Jurisprudence at 206-7 (cited in note 12); Aldrich, 88 AmJ Ind L at 603 (cited in
note 12); Brower and Brueschke, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal at 382-83 (cited in note 11).
18. Phillips Petroleum Co Iran v Iran, Award No 425-39-2 para 98 (June 29, 1989). reprinted in 21 Iran-
US CTR 79,115.





been justified under the Law of 16 June 1979 in appointing a provisional manager for
AFFA."2'
The Tribunal has considered various allegations of expropriatory state actions.
A large number of cases involved the appointment by Iranian government agencies of
individuals charged with the supervision or management of Iranian companies in
which United States claimants had ownership interests. Almost invariably, the
government-appointed manager replaced the original managers installed by the
owners. Those appointments, usually termed "provisional" or "temporary," were made
pursuant to legislation enacted by the Islamic Republic of Iran for the stated purpose
of securing critical industries-thus to protect the interests of both the Iranian
workers and the government in the continued operation of certain companies. In
many, if not most, of the cases where Iran appointed a person to supervise or manage
a company, the Tribunal found that an indirect expropriation had occurred.' In
Birnbaum, as in other cases, the Tribunal looked to the following factors in making
that determination:
While assumption of control over property by a government-for example, through
appointment of provisional managers-does not automatically and immediately
justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the government, thus
requiring compensation under international law, "such a conclusion is warranted
whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of
ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral." . . . The
Tribunal has previously regarded the appointment of a provisional manager as an
"important factor" and a 'highly significant indication' in finding a deprivation
because of the attendant denial of the owner's right to mana e the enterprise....
The Tribunal has also held that the temporary nature of an appointment of
managers has not precluded a finding of a taking.
Thus, in the Tribunal's practice, the mere appointment of a government-
manager is not sufficient to warrant a finding that an indirect expropriation occurred
under customary international law. What is required is a showing that, through the
appointment of the manager, the government asserted such control over the company
that the claimant has been deprived of his property interests. 4 In Birnbaum, for
example, the Tribunal also considered the fact that, since the date of the appointment,
21. Birnbaum, 29 Iran-US CTR at 270, para 35. See also Ebrabimi v Iran, Award No 560-44/46/47-3,
para 72 (Oct 12, 1994) (not yet published in the Iran-US CTR series).
22. Consider Starrett Housing Corp, 4 Iran-US CTR 122; Tippetts, 6 Iran-US CTR 219; Sedco, Inc v
National Iranian Oil Co, Interlocutory Award No ITL 55-129-3 (Oct 28, 1985), reprinted in 9 Iran-
US CTR 248; Phelps Dodge, 10 Iran-US CTR 121; Payne, 12 Iran-US CTR 3; Sagbi v Iran, Award
No 544-298-2 Uan 22, 1993), reprinted in 29 Iran-US CTR 20; Birnbaum, 29 Iran-US CTR 260;
Kbosrowsbabi v Iran, Award No 558-178-2 (June 30, 1994) (not yet published in the Iran-US CTR
series); Ebrabimi (cited in note 21). But see Otis Elevator Co v Iran, Award No 304-284-2 (Apr 29,
1987), reprinted in 14 Iran-US CTR 283 and Motorola, Inc v Iran National Airlines Corp, Award No
373-481-3 (June 28, 1988), reprinted in 19 Iran-US CTR 73 (both awards holding that the
appointment of government-managers in the circumstances did not result in an expropriation).
23. Birnbaum, 29 Iran-US CTR at 268, para 28 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
24. See id at 267, para 27.
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the company had remained under the control of government appointees and that no
information on the status or operation of the company had ever been sent to the
claimant or to the original partners.' In the circumstances of that case, it found that
the expropriation occurred on the date when the government-appointed manager
assumed his duties at the company, four days after his appointmenr? In contrast, in
an earlier case, Sedco, Inc, the Tribunal found that, in the circumstances, the
expropriation of the claimant's interest in an Iranian company had coincided with the
appointment by Iran of temporary managers for the company. The Tribunal
explained that, when, "as in the instant case, the seizure of control by appointment of
'temporary' managers clearly ripens into an outright taking of tide, the date of
appointment presumptively should be regarded as the date of taking," and that such
presumption becomes conclusive if"it is also found that on the date of the government
appointment of 'temporary' managers there is no reasonable prospect of return of
control"7 It should be noted that in a number of awards, the Tribunal emphasized
the fact that the laws authorizing the appointment of government-managers or
supervisors deprived the owners of the targeted companies of significant ownership
rights, including the right to manage their properties."
The Tribunal has addressed in several awards the question of whether the failure
of an Iranian government agency to grant a re-export permit for equipment in Iran
owned by a United States contractor constituted an expropriation under customary
international law. In Sedco, Inc, the Tribunal stated, generally, that "It]he failure of a
party to render contractually required assistance towards exportation could at some
point in time ripen into a taking or conversion of the property affected."" In Houston
Contracting Company, the Tribunal observed that the claimant carried the burden of
proving that "it took all reasonable steps to export the equipment, so as to satisf, the
burden of proof to show that the losses suffered by it were incurred as a result of the
acts or omissions of [Iran] and not by [the claimant's] own failure to act.""' In
Seismograph Service Corporation, the Tribunal held that the imposition of certain
conditions upon the re-export of the claimant's property was unwarranted and
unreasonable and amounted to a compensable measure affecting property rights, but
not to an expropriation because the claimant had maintained a contractual right to sell
25. Seeid at 269, para 31.
26. See id at 269, para 32.
27. Sedco, Inc, 9 Iran-US CTR at 278-79. See also Payne, 12 Iran-US CTR at 11, para 25; Ebtraimi,
Award No 560-44/46/47-3 para 79.
28. See Birnbaum, 29 Iran-US CTR at 268, para 29; see also Sasi, 29 Iran-US CTR at 45, para. 76,
KIosrowsbabi, Award No 558-178-2 para 25.
29. Sedco, Inc v National Iranian Oil Co, Award No 309-129-3, para 21 Uuly 7, 1987), reprinted in 15
Iran-US CTR 23, 31.
30. Houston Contracting Co v National Iranian Oil C, Award No 378-173-3, para 467 Uuly 22, 1938).




the property in Iran.3 Petrolane, Inc presented a factual situation similar to Seismograph,
yet the Tribunal reached a quite different conclusion. It held that, by preventing the
claimant from re-exporting its equipment, the respondent "deprived the Claimant of
the effective use, benefit and control of the equipment... in breach of contract, as well
as constituting an expropriation for which the Government of Iran bears
responsibility."32 It should be noted that in Petrolane, Inc, Chamber Two of the
Tribunal cited the Awards in Sedco, Inc and Houston Contracting, but did not cite
Chamber Three's Award in Seismograph.
IV.
In Pope & Talbot, Canada seemed to argue that, because the measures it had
taken to implement the SLA were cast in the form of regulations, they constituted an
exercise of police powers, which, if non-discriminatory, were beyond the reach of the
NAFTA rules concerning expropriations. The NAFTA tribunal rejected Canada's
argument, saying that it went too far. It stated that "[r]egulations can indeed be
exercised in a way that would constitute creeping expropriation."" It further noted
that "Canada's suggestion that regulations can run afoul of international legal
requirements only if discriminatory is inconsistent with the Restatement: '[A] state is
responsible for expropriation of alien property without just compensation even if
property of nationals is treated similarly."''"
Here again the jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal offers
insights. It was previously noted that, in the temporary-manager cases, the Tribunal
denied the police power or regulatory defense." The Tribunal has also considered
whether certain Iranian land-reform legislation resulted in the expropriation, under
customary international law, of real property held by dual Iranian-American
claimants. In Karubian,' the claimant asserted that certain Iranian urban-land
legislation that provided for the cancellation by Iran of the title deeds of mawat land-
undeveloped land with no prior record of development-along with certain Iranian
governmental actions amounted to an expropriation of his real properties. The
Tribunal held that the mere existence and binding force of those laws and regulations
did not, by themselves, amount to measures expropriating the claimant's properties
31. See Seismograph Service Corp v National Iranian Oil Co, Award No 420-443-3, paras 301-2 (Mar 31,
1989), reprinted in 22 Iran-US CTR 3,79.
32. Petrolane, Inc v Iran, Award No 518-131-2, para 97 (Aug 14, 1991), reprinted in 27 Iran-US CTR
64,96.
33. Pope & Talbot at para 99.
34. Id at para 99 n 73, quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations of the United States § 712, cmt i
(1986).
35. See text accompanying notes 19 and 21.
36. Karubian v Iran, Award No 569-419-2 (Mar 6, 1996) (not yet published in the Iran-US CTR
series).
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because there was no evidence of a governmental determination that the claimant's
properties were mawaCn Nonetheless, the Tribunal concluded that the interference
created by the cumulative effect of the land-reform legislation and related
governmental action was of such a degree as to constitute other measures affecting the
property rights of the claimant within the meaning of Article II, paragraph 1, of the
Claims Settlement Declaration. Consequently, the Tribunal held Iran responsible for
damages resulting from these measures.'s The Tribunal noted that the legislation
"made all undeveloped or unutilized properties in both urban and rural areas
vulnerable to a determination that they were matvat.... Under the circumstances,
[even in the absence of such a determination,] the Claimant would have had
difficulties in finding a buyer for his properties."'
In Mobtadi,. the claimant alleged that the same Iranian land-reform legislation at
issue in Karubian effected a "legislative taking" of his real property in Iran. While
concluding that the land-reform legislation was not self-executing and did not operate
automatically to expropriate his property,4 the Tribunal nevertheless found that the
legislation represented a measure that interfered with the claimant's property rights.
Its effect "was to impair the right and real possibility of the Claimant to transfer his
property," and thus it was a "measure[] affecting property rights."4'
While in Karubian and Mobtadi the Tribunal found that the claimants had been
subjected to "measures affecting property rights," rather than indirect expropriations,
those precedents might nonetheless prove to be useful to international tribunals in
determining whether specific measures of interference with property rights "impair
the economic value of an investment to a degree that is equivalent to expropriation.
In particular, they can provide useful insight into the methodology that the Tribunal
employed in establishing the nature of the legislation at issue in those cases and its
impact on the claimants' property rights.
V.
As this essay has shown, in deciding claims arising out of (direct or indirect)
expropriation, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has consistently applied
customary international law. Thus, the Tribunal's decisions on indirect expropriation
37. See id atparas 106-11.
38. See id at para 144.
39. Id at para 143.
40. Mobtadi v Iran, Award No 573-271-3 (Dec 2,1996) (nor yet published in the Iran-US CTR series).
41. See id at parta 55.
42. See id at paras 68-69. It is clear that the Iranian land-reform legislation at issue in Karuhoan and
Mobtadi, along with the Iranian legislation at issue in the temporary-manager cases, represented
factual circumstances that the Tribunal examined in determining the degree of government
interference with the claimants' property rights, so the issue of ex fitalis does not arise.




of property, as lex generalis, constitute a significant body of precedent from which other
international tribunals, including arbitral tribunals established under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA, can draw. There should be no doubt that the Tribunal's expropriation
jurisprudence has contributed significantly to the development of a "comprehensive
doctrine of indirect expropriation," 4 a doctrine still in its infancy."
44. Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID Rev-Foreign Inv LJ, 41, 43 (1986).
45. See id at 43; Julie A. Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11 - The Challenge of Private Party Participation, 16 J
Ind Arb 1, 7 June 1999) ("There is ample jurisprudence on what constitutes direct expropriation,
but there is almost a complete absence of a doctrinal basis for deciding what constitutes indirect
expropriation.").
Vol. 2 No.
